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Abstract
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punish‐
ment of Crimes Against Humanity document is the latest international instrument
to address gender-based crimes under international law and the first to do so out‐
side the context of international courts. The elaboration of a treaty on crimes
against humanity provides a critical opportunity to affirm that gender-based
crimes are among the gravest crimes under international law. This article examines
discussions on the meaning of the term ‘gender’ under the ILC’s Draft Articles, with
reference to the discussions two decades prior on the definition of ‘gender’ in the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the basis for the Articles’ con‐
sideration of sexual and gender-based violence. It then turns to the ILC consulta‐
tion process, and the 2019 discussion of the ILC’s Draft Articles in the Sixth (Legal)
Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on the term ‘gender’. Addition‐
ally, it considers a number of concerns raised by States and civil society on the defi‐
nition of some of the gender-based crimes included in the Draft Articles and con‐
cludes by arguing for a comprehensive gender analysis of all of the Draft Articles.
Keywords: gender, crimes against humanity, international criminal law, Rome
Statute.
1 Introduction
It should be well accepted by now that any multilateral treaty adopted by the
international community should be gender sensitive, particularly one focused on
crimes against humanity.1 Therefore, it was expected that the International Law
Commission (ILC) would consider gender-based violations when preparing its
Draft Articles on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity
* Indira Rosenthal, Independent Consultant, Gender, Law and Justice; PhD Candidate, Faculty of
Law, University of Tasmania (Australia). Valerie Oosterveld, University of Western Ontario
Faculty of Law (Canada).
1 There have been numerous advances in this respect in international criminal law jurisprudence.
See, e.g., S. Brammertz & M. Jarvis (Eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY,
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016.
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(Draft Articles).2 It was also encouraging that many States expressed views on
gender issues in response to the ILC’s call for submissions on its Draft Articles,
particularly since this treaty would represent the first time that sexual and gen‐
der-based violence is criminalized in an international treaty outside of the con‐
text of international courts. It was particularly interesting to observe the evolu‐
tion of the discussions around the term ‘gender’ in the Draft Articles, which
reflected a microcosm of similar discussions in other negotiations, such as the
drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Coun‐
cil of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against
Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention) and numerous other
agreements.3
This article begins by examining the negotiations on the definition of the
term ‘gender’ in the Rome Statute of the ICC. It then turns to the definition of
‘gender’ in the ILC Draft Articles, the ILC’s consultation process and the 2019 dis‐
cussion of the ILC’s Draft Articles in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the United
Nations (UN) General Assembly. It also considers other gender-related sugges‐
tions made by States and civil society with respect to the crimes against humanity
of persecution, sexual violence and forced pregnancy. It ends by discussing
whether a comprehensive review of gender-related implications is required of the
Draft Articles as a whole.
2 ‘Gender’ in the Rome Statute of the ICC
The term ‘gender’ was used and defined for the first time in international crim‐
inal law in the 1998 Rome Statute.4 For decades, this term has been a flashpoint
within international multilateral negotiations, including in the Rome Statute
negotiations.5 During those negotiations, two opposing views emerged. On one
side of the debate were a minority of States and the Holy See, supported by con‐
servative non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which equated ‘gender’ with
the biological sex of males and females. They opposed the use of the term in the
2 Int’l Law Comm’n, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity’,
in Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, UN Doc. A/74/10 (2019).
3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on 17 July 1998, entered into force on 1 July 2002, 2187 UNTS 3 [Rome
Statute]; Council of Europe, Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women
and Domestic Violence, adopted by the Council of Europe on 11 May 2011, entered into force on
1 August 2014, CETS 210 [Istanbul Convention]. See also, e.g., Report of the Fourth World Con‐
ference on Women, adopted at the 16th plenary meeting by United Nations on 15 September
1995, Addendum, Ann. IV, UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20/Rev.1, UN Sales No. 96.IV.13 (1996);
Report of the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II), adopted at the
18th plenary meeting by UN Conference on Human Settlements on 14 June 1996, Ann. 1, UN
Doc. A/CONF.165/14 (1996), Para. 46.
4 The term is defined in the Rome Statute, Art. 7(3), and also appears in Arts. 7(1)(h), 21(3), 42(9),
54, and 68.
5 See, e.g., V. Oosterveld, ‘The Definition of “Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court: A Step Forward or Back for International Criminal Justice?’ Harvard Human
Rights Journal, Vol. 18, 2005, pp. 55-84, at 66-67 and notes 62-63.
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Rome Statute, as they associated it “with ideas they [view] as transgressive, such
as women’s empowerment, equality between the sexes, and the end of discrimi‐
nation against people who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, or
queer (LGBTIQ)”.6 However, once it became clear that they could not prevent its
use, they sought to give it a narrow, biologically-focused definition.7 On the other
side of the debate were the majority of States and NGOs, which understood ‘gen‐
der’ to refer to socially-constructed ‘maleness’ and ‘femaleness’; in other words, a
learnt rather than innate category.8 They understood ‘gender’ to include socially-
determined roles, opportunities and expectations (including with respect to phys‐
ical appearance and behaviour) attributed to a person on the basis of their actual
or perceived biological sex.9 This was how the term had been understood in the
UN system prior to the Rome Statute negotiations.10
After tense and prolonged negotiations, a solution was finally adopted, defin‐
ing the term in Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute, which states:
For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term “gender” refers
to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term
“gender” does not indicate any meaning different from the above.11
This definition has been described as “constructively ambiguous” – a term (and
tactic) sometimes used by diplomats during treaty negotiations to accommodate
seemingly irreconcilable views.12 In this case, the impasse in the negotiations was
resolved by referring in the definition to both the social construction of maleness
and femaleness (“within the context of society”) and the biological aspects of this
social construction (“the two sexes”). As such, it provides a broad definition that
covers all manifestations of socially-constructed gender norms, and is flexible
enough to embrace future developments in international law.
This outcome is reflected in the ICC Prosecutor’s Policy Paper on Sexual and
Gender-based Crimes. It states that the Rome Statute definition “acknowledge[es]
the social construction of gender, and the accompanying roles, behaviours, activi‐
6 R. Grey, J. O’Donohue, I. Rosenthal, et al., ‘Gender-Based Persecution as a Crime Against
Humanity, The Road Ahead’, Journal of International Criminal Justice, Vol. 17, 2019, pp. 957-979,
at 958.
7 Oosterveld, 2005, supra note 5, pp. 64-65.
8 Ibid.
9 This was reflected in the two main UN definitions in use at the time of the adoption of the Rome
Statute: Oosterveld, 2005, supra note 5, p. 67. These definitions were from ‘Report of the Expert
Group Meeting on the Development of Guidelines for the Integration of Gender Perspectives in
United Nations Human Rights Activities and Programs’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/105 (1995), at
Para. 13; and ‘Integrating the Human Rights of Women Throughout the United Nations System:
Report of the Secretary-General’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/40 (1996), at Para. 10.
10 Oosterveld, 2005, supra note 5, p. 67.
11 Art. 7 lists the crimes against humanity over which the ICC has jurisdiction, including persecu‐
tion on a number of specified grounds that include ‘gender’ (Art. 7(1)(h)). ‘Gender’ is the only
persecutory ground defined in the Rome Statute.
12 V. Oosterveld, ‘Constructive Ambiguity and the Meaning of “Gender” for the International Crim‐
inal Court’, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Vol. 16, No. 4, 2014, pp. 563-580, at 564.
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ties, and attributes assigned to women and men, and to girls and boys”.13 The
ICC’s judges have yet to discuss the definition in their jurisprudence, but may do
so in the trial of Prosecutor v. Al Hassan, the first-ever case involving charges of
the crime against humanity of gender-based persecution.14
Despite the resolution in Rome, the definition has been criticized precisely
for its ambiguity over the intervening twenty-two years,15 and has not been repli‐
cated in the statutes of subsequent international criminal tribunals.16 Moreover,
the conflict over its use at the international level has continued. In fact, the same
States and NGOs that opposed a definition of ‘gender’ as a social construct during
the ICC negotiations continue to try to block its application, whenever possible,
in the UN system and other multilateral fora.17 It is for this reason that, when the
idea of a crimes against humanity treaty was first proposed by civil society,
experts suggested that the term ‘gender’ be left undefined or, if a definition was
to be included, a clearer iteration that “more obviously satisfies the principle of
legality” be used.18
3 Defining ‘Gender’ in the ILC Draft
It was against this background that the ILC began considering the issue of a draft
treaty on crimes against humanity in 2014.19 An ILC-appointed Special Rappor‐
teur, Sean Murphy, led this work, reporting back several times to the ILC with a
series of proposals for the Draft Articles that it ultimately adopted. These
included a proposal to replicate the Rome Statute’s list of crimes against human‐
ity violations, including its definition of the term ‘gender’, which delineates the
13 Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, ‘Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes’, 2014, p. 3.
14 Public Redacted Version of “Submission of Prosecution Trial Brief”, Prosecutor v. Al Hassan Ag
Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, ICC-01/12-01/18, 18 May 2020, pp. 6-9. The Al Hassan
trial began on 13 July 2020.
15 See Oosterveld, 2005, supra note 5, pp. 55-56, describing negative reactions, and p. 77 for posi‐
tive reactions.
16 The definition was used, however, in the East Timor panels: United Nations Transitional Admin‐
istration in East Timor, Reg. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive Jurisdiction
over Serious Criminal Offences, Section 5.3, UN Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2005).
17 See, e.g., D. Otto, ‘Holding up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit?: A Critical Analysis of the
Fourth World Conference on Women’, Australian Feminist Law Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996,
pp. 7-28; J. Borger, ‘Trump Administration Wants to Remove ‘Gender’ from UN Human Rights
Documents’, The Guardian, 25 October 2018, available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2018/
oct/24/trump-administration-gender-transgender-united-nations; Amnesty International, ‘Hun‐
gary: Blocking of Domestic Violence Treaty Further Exposes Women During COVID-19 Crisis’,
5 May 2020, available at: www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/05/hungary-blocking-of-
domestic-violence-treaty-further-exposes-women/, on the Hungarian government’s incorrect
claims that the Istanbul Convention “prescribes dangerous gender ideologies”.
18 See, e.g., V. Oosterveld, ‘Gender-Based Crimes Against Humanity’, in L.N. Sadat (Ed.), Forging a
Convention for Crimes Against Humanity, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 81-83.
19 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report on the Work of Its Sixty-Sixth Session, UN Doc. A/69/10 (2014), Para.
266.
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crime against humanity of persecution on gender grounds.20 The ILC justified this
approach on the basis that the “Rome Statute definition [of crimes against
humanity] represents a widely-accepted definition of settled international law”,
concluding that “[a]s such, for the present draft articles, it should be used
verbatim”.21
During the early part of the ILC’s deliberations on the Draft Articles, some
supportive States engaged in the process urged the ILC to avoid reopening the
fierce debate on the meaning and use of the term ‘gender’ by incorporating the
Rome Statute definition in its entirety.22 They feared that the ‘gender’ definition
debate was so polarizing that departing from the Rome Statute approach could
derail the crimes against humanity treaty project. However, by the time the ILC
submitted its second reading of the Draft Articles to the UN General Assembly
four years later, it had reversed its position and dropped the definition of ‘gender’
altogether.23
What prompted this change of approach? In the intervening years, a number
of States, UN bodies and NGOs from around the world had provided comments
and observations on the Draft Articles at the ILC’s invitation. Their responses to
the first review of the text on this issue revealed a significant level of concern
with, and even opposition to, adopting the Rome Statute’s definition of ‘gender’.
Ultimately, the ILC found this feedback persuasive.24
The reasonably high level of engagement on this issue by both governments
and NGOs did not arise organically. Rather, it was prompted by a civil society
campaign directed by a consortium with the express purpose of mobilizing
against the replication of the Rome Statute ‘gender’ definition, and certain other
gender-related provisions, in the Draft Articles. The stated objective of the NGOs
was to ensure that a future crimes against humanity treaty delivered “better pro‐
tection to women and LGBTIQ persons”.25
20 S. Murphy (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), First Report on Crimes Against
Humanity, UN Doc. A/CN.4/680 (2015), at p. 87. Note that the definition was adopted by the ILC
verbatim from the Rome Statute, with three exceptions related to the jurisdiction of the ICC and
therefore not relevant to the draft convention.
21 Ibid., Para. 267.
22 C.C. Jalloh, ‘The International Law Commission’s First Draft Convention on Crimes Against
Humanity: Codification, Progressive Development, or Both?’, Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law, Vol. 52, No. 1, 2020, pp. 331-405, at 358.
23 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Seventy-First Session, UN Doc. A/74/10
(2019), Para. 42.
24 Ibid., Paras. 41-42; S. Murphy, (Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity), Fourth Report
on Crimes Against Humanity, UN Doc. A/CN.4/725 (2019), Paras. 80-86. Note that the ILC
Statute requires it to take into account the views of States.
25 The consortium comprised MADRE, OutRight Action International, The Human Rights and Gen‐
der Justice (HRGJ) Clinic of the City of New York (CUNY) School of Law, and the Center for
Socio-Legal Research at the Universidad de Los Andes, available at: www.madre.org/
genderingCAH.
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4 The ILC Consultation Process
The ILC invited comments on its first draft of the text, which, in this case, was
completed in 2017, and subsequently received responses from thirty-nine States
to its request for views on the Draft Articles.26 The primary concern among
responding States about the Rome Statute’s ‘gender’ definition was:
[It] does not take into consideration the developments of the last twenty
years in the areas of international human rights law and international crim‐
inal law, particularly with regard to sexual and gender-based crimes[.]27
As well, they were concerned that the definition is “opaque, outdated and not in
line with the recent, more inclusive and gender-sensitive definitions of ‘gen‐
der’”;28 is “obsolete”29 and “does not reflect current realities and content of inter‐
national law”.30 These same concerns were repeated in different formulae by
nineteen of the thirty-eight countries that submitted written comments on the
Draft Articles, echoing the views advocated by the civil society campaigners, as
discussed later in this article.31
The ILC’s Special Rapporteur reported that States advancing these views
identified key developments in international law since the adoption of the Rome
Statute to support their positions. These included the adoption by the ICC Prose‐
cutor in 2014 of the public Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-based Crimes and its
understanding of gender;32 guidance from the International Committee of the
Red Cross in 2004 on Addressing the Needs of Women Affected by Armed Conflict;33
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
26 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Cuba, the Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Israel,
Japan, Liechtenstein, Malta, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Panama, Peru, Portugal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sweden (on behalf of the five Nordic countries: Denmark, Finland, Ice‐
land, Norway and Sweden), Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, the United States of America and Uruguay. Int’l Law Comm’n, Comments and
Observations Received from Governments, International Organizations and Others, UN Doc. A/CN.
4/726+Add.1+Add.2 (2019).
27 Murphy, supra note 24, Comments and observations of Belgium, Para. 80.
28 Ibid., Comments and observations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Para. 80.
29 Ibid., Comments and observations of Costa Rica, Para. 80.
30 Ibid., Comments and observations of Sweden on behalf of the Nordic countries, as reported in
Murphy, Para. 80.
31 The 19 States were Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Estonia, Liechtenstein, Malta, New Zealand, Sweden (on behalf of the Nordic
countries), the United Kingdom and Uruguay. Ibid., p. 32, note 181.
32 The Policy pledges the ICC Office of the Prosecutor to “apply and interpret the Rome Statute def‐
inition of gender in accordance with internationally recognised human rights” as required under
Art. 21(3) of the Statute: ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Policy Paper, 2014, Para. 15. For a discus‐
sion of the Policy Paper, see, e.g., V. Oosterveld, ‘The ICC Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes: A Crucial Step for International Criminal Law’, William and Mary Journal of Women
and the Law, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2018, pp. 443-457.
33 International Committee of the Red Cross, ‘Addressing the Needs of Women Affected by Armed
Conflict: an ICRC Guidance Document’, Geneva, ICRC, 2004, p. 7.
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Women Committee’s 2010 General Recommendation No. 28 on States Parties’ Core
Treaty Obligations under Article 2;34 adoption by the Council of Europe of the 2011
Istanbul Convention;35 and recent reports of UN Special Rapporteurs and inde‐
pendent experts.36 Each of these authoritative documents share a common
understanding of ‘gender’ as a social construct, which they set out explicitly.
Sixteen of the nineteen States commenting on the definition of ‘gender’ rec‐
ommended that it be deleted. The remaining three (Chile, Costa Rica and Liech‐
tenstein) proposed replacing it with a clearer definition, but if there was no agree‐
ment on this, that it should be deleted.37
The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights,38 twenty-four
UN Special Rapporteurs and an independent adviser urged the Commission “to
either remove the definition of gender in article 3(3) … (since no other persecu‐
tory category comes with a definition) or to insist on the social construction of
gender as it is widely recognized to be”.39
In addition, 583 civil society organizations from 103 countries, as well as
many academics, signed an open letter drafted by the civil society consortium rec‐
ommending that the definition of ‘gender’ either be removed or revised using the
definition of gender set out by the Office of the Prosecutor in the Policy Paper.40
Several separate submissions were also made by NGOs and some academic
experts along similar lines.41 For example, the consortium made a separate sub‐
mission in which it cited jurisprudence from the ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda as evidence of an evolving understanding of ‘gender’, and
seventy African-based civil society organizations and human rights activists
argued for an inclusive understanding of gender in the treaty as it concerns the
most serious atrocities and so, “by its nature should protect all of us”.42
In the end, in light of the concerns raised, and in the absence of a provision
like Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute requiring the articles to be interpreted con‐
sistently with international human rights law and without any adverse distinc‐
34 Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No.
28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention (CEDAW/C/GC/
28). Para. 5 of the Recommendation notes that, “[a]lthough CEDAW only refers to sex-based
discrimination, interpreting article 1 together with articles 2 (f) and 5 (a) indicates that the Con‐
vention covers gender-based discrimination against women.” It explains the difference in mean‐
ing between the term ‘sex’ (biological differences) and ‘gender’ (socially constructed identities,
attributes and roles). Note, Art. 2 obliges States Parties to condemn discrimination against
women and “to pursue all available means” and a policy to eliminate it.
35 Istanbul Convention, supra note 3.
36 For a list, see Murphy, supra note 24, p. 33, fn. 192.
37 Ibid., Para. 82.
38 Ibid., Para. 83.
39 Ibid., Para. 83.
40 Ibid., Para. 84. See also L. Davis, ‘This Is How We Won a Historic Victory for Women’s and
LGBTIQ Rights in International Law’, Press Release, 25 June 2019, available at: www.madre.org/
press-publications/article/how-we-won-historic-victory-women’s-and-lgbtiq-rights-international
-la. The NGO open letter is available at: www.madre.org/press-publications/human-rights-
report/sign-now-support-gender-rights-crimes-against-humanity-treaty.
41 For a list, see Murphy, supra note 24, p. 35, fn. 201.
42 Ibid., Para. 84.
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tion on grounds such as gender,43 the Special Rapporteur recommended that the
ILC delete the definition from the Draft Articles.44 The ILC concurred and the
definition was removed.
5 Debate on the Draft Articles – 2019 UN General Assembly Sixth
Committee
The ILC submitted its second reading of the Draft Articles to the UN General
Assembly for consideration at its seventy-fourth session in 2019.45 In all, fifty
governments, as well as Sierra Leone on behalf of the Africa Group and Norway
on behalf of the Nordic Group, made statements on the Draft Articles.46 Of these,
seventeen States and the Holy See specifically addressed the removal of the defi‐
nition of ‘gender’. Five States and the Holy See argued against the removal of the
definition,47 and twelve spoke in support.48 The statements made by these two
groups, although not detailed or comprehensive, confirm that the strongly held
opposing viewpoints on the meaning of ‘gender’ that led to the “constructively
ambiguous”49 solution to the definition in the Rome Statute have not dissipated.
The group arguing for the retention of the Rome Statute definition wished to
limit the meaning of ‘gender’ to that of male or female biological sex. Of this
group, two States – Senegal and Sudan – said that its deletion would impact on
whether a crimes against humanity treaty could be elaborated at all.50 For
example, Senegal said it was concerned with the removal of the definition and
stated that this “will undoubtedly remain one of the major obstacles to the elabo‐
ration of the convention”.51 Others who regretted the ILC’s decision not to
include the Rome Statute definition of ‘gender’ referred to the sensitivity of the
issue as a reason it should have been retained. In their view, the definition repre‐
sents “internationally agreed language”52 that the ILC should adopt “to ensure the
43 The combination of Arts. 7(3) and 21(3) of the Rome Statute ensures that the ‘gender’ definition
evolves as international human rights and non-discrimination laws evolve.
44 Murphy, supra note 24, Paras. 86, 101-103.
45 Ibid., Para. 44.
46 Non-State observers, the Council of Europe, European Union and the Holy See also made state‐
ments, available at: www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/74/ilc.shtml.
47 They were Belarus, Egypt, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Uzbekistan and the Holy See: Sixth Committee,
‘Summary Record of the 26th Meeting’, 29 October 2019, UN Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.24.
48 They were Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Estonia, New Zealand, Norway (on behalf of the Nordic
Group – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), Slovenia and the United Kingdom. See
Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, ‘Compilation of Government Reactions to the Inter‐
national Law Commission’s Project on Crimes Against Humanity’, July 2020, available at:
https://law.wustl.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Compilation-of-6th-Committee-Responses-
to-CAH-2013-2019.pdf.
49 Oosterveld, supra note 12.
50 Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, supra note 48, pp. 52, 54.
51 It stated: “restera, sans doute, l’un des obstacles majeurs á l’élaboration de la convention.” ‘Projet
de Déclaration de la délégation Sénégalaise’, 28 October 2019, available at: http://
statements.unmeetings.org/media2/23328751/-f-senegal-statement.pdf.
52 See, e.g., statement by Uzbekistan, Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 26th Meeting’,
31 October 2019, UN Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.26, Para. 32.
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universality of a future convention”.53 Others argued that the Rome Statute lan‐
guage is also reflected in domestic laws: Togo reported that its national law
defined ‘gender’ as referring to the “two sexes, male and female, pursuant to the
Togolese Persons and Family Code, which did not indicate any other meaning”.54
On the other hand, twelve countries supported the removal of the definition,
with some indicating a second alternative of clearly defining ‘gender’ as a social
construct.55 Of these, a number of countries explicitly stated that they were
“pleased” that the ILC had removed the ‘gender’ definition.56 They considered it
to be out of step with the international community’s contemporary understand‐
ing of gender, which they said has evolved since 1998.
On the basis of the brief statements made in the Sixth Committee, it seems
likely that the contention around the use and meaning of the term ‘gender’ will
continue in any future negotiations on a crime against humanity treaty. At the
same time, the ILC’s consultation process and the Sixth Committee debate reveal
a much deeper and more widespread understanding of the term ‘gender’ than was
evident in 1998 at the adoption of the Rome Statute. This reflects a shift among
at least some in the international community in understanding the ways in which
gender norms are used to discriminate against and persecute people who are, or
who are perceived to be, gender nonconforming.57 However, it should be noted
that this understanding is not entirely new. At the Rome Statute negotiations,
many States were aware of the history of persecution of homosexual men by the
Nazis during the Second World War, as well as the continuing discrimination and
vilification of LGBTIQ people in many countries around the world. Ensuring that
the Rome Statute had jurisdiction over all kinds of gender-based persecution,
including persecution on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity, was
therefore important for a large number of States negotiating the Rome Statute.
6 Beyond the Definition of ‘Gender’: Other Gender-related Concerns
Whether or not to include a definition of ‘gender’ was not the only gender-related
issue arising in relation to the Draft Articles. Several States, UN Special Rappor‐
teurs, civil society organizations and others raised concerns about other gender-
53 See, e.g., statement by Belarus, Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 24th Meeting’,
31 October 2019, UN Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.24, Para. 75.
54 Statement by Togo, Sixth Committee, ‘Summary Record of the 26th Meeting’, 31 October 2019,
UN Doc. A/C.6/74/SR.26, Para. 24.
55 E.g., Portugal, and Norway on behalf of the Nordic States, see Whitney R. Harris World Law Insti‐
tute, supra note 48, pp. 8 and 9 (with links to full statements).
56 E.g., Belgium, Canada, Estonia and Slovenia, see ibid., pp. 43, 44, 46, and 54 (with links to full
statements).
57 On the other hand, at the time of writing, some States were taking regressive steps, including
Poland withdrawing from the Istanbul Convention on the basis of its use of gender, see, e.g., BBC,
‘Istanbul Convention: Poland to Leave European Treaty on Violence Against Women’, available
at: https://bbc.in/39ydJaJ. Additionally, discrimination against, and persecution of, LGBTIQ
people around the world continues: see, e.g., Human Dignity Trust, available at:
www.humandignitytrust.org.
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specific aspects of the ILC’s Draft Articles in their submissions during the consul‐
tation period. Specifically, there were calls for expanding the persecutory
grounds, and suggestions that the definitions of two of the gender-based crimes
listed in the crimes against humanity provision, “sexual violence” and “forced
pregnancy”, need further analysis and possible amendment.
In relation to persecutory grounds, the ILC Special Rapporteur reported that
twenty-one UN Special Rapporteurs and an independent expert urged that the
grounds for persecution
be expanded and updated so as to include … grounds of language, social ori‐
gin, age, disability, health, sexual orientation, gender identity, sex character‐
istics and indigenous, refugee, statelessness or migratory status.58
This viewpoint was shared by some civil society organizations, which referred to
numerous resolutions, decisions and declarations by UN and regional human
rights and other bodies over the past twenty years recognizing discrimination on
the basis of disability, Indigenous status, age, social origin, language and migrant
and refugee status.59
Ultimately, however, the Special Rapporteur, and subsequently the ILC,
declined to add any further grounds to the persecution definition on the basis
that the Draft Articles included the catch-all phrase “or other grounds”. In the
Special Rapporteur’s view, this phrase “embraces other and evolving grounds on
which persecution may be found”.60 The counterargument is that the catch-all
phrase is not as open ended as indicated, as these “other grounds” must meet the
high threshold of “universally recognized as impermissible under international
law”.61 The Special Rapporteur indicated that
the Commission may wish to consider adjusting the commentary so as to pro‐
vide a fuller account of what is meant by “other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law”, taking into considera‐
tion the comments received.62
However, the commentary on the list of persecutory grounds simply notes that
other grounds were suggested and that the Draft Article “allows for persecution
58 Murphy, supra note 24, Para. 60.
59 Submission of MADRE, OutRight Action International, The Human Rights and Gender Justice
Clinic of the City of New York School of Law, and the Center for Socio-Legal Research at the Uni‐
versidad de Los Andes to the ILC on ‘The Definition of Gender in the Draft Crimes Against
Humanity Convention’, 1 December 2018, on file with the authors.
60 Murphy, supra note 24, Para. 61.
61 See the critique in W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute, 1st ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 177, noting that the enlargement of
the persecutory grounds seemingly promised by the catch-all phrase “may be purely illusory”.
62 Murphy, supra note 24, Para. 61.
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on grounds other than those expressly listed, provided that such grounds ‘are uni‐
versally recognized as impermissible under international law’”.63
The crime of other “sexual violence” also attracted some commentary. Draft
Article 3(1)(g), copied verbatim from the Rome Statute, provides for the crimes
against humanity of “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg‐
nancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable grav‐
ity” (emphasis added). In its statement during the debate on the ILC’s second
reading in the Sixth Committee, Canada said that it “would view negotiations of a
convention as an opportunity to clarify the definition of ‘sexual violence’ to
reflect recent discussions within the international community”.64 Those “recent
discussions” include an expert-led global civil society campaign to provide clarity
as to the scope of the term ‘sexual violence’ and to “[enhance] understanding of
the many various forms of sexual violence”.65 After extensive consultations,
including with many survivors of a range of sexual violence in different contexts
around the world, the campaign adopted the Civil Society Declaration on Sexual
Violence in 2019.66 The Declaration does not purport to provide an exhaustive
list of all forms of sexual violence, but it does describe a wide range of conduct as
qualifying as sexual violence. As Canada indicated, the elaboration of a crimes
against humanity treaty could provide an important opportunity to clarify and
expand the scope and meaning of sexual violence.
Another gender-related issue raised in the commentary on the ILC Draft Arti‐
cles relates to the crime against humanity of forced pregnancy.67 The ILC copied
the definition of this crime from Article 7(2)(f) of the Rome Statute: “[T]he
unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of
affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law”. The provision ends, as it does in the Rome
Statute, with “this definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting
national laws relating to pregnancy”. One civil society commentator critiqued
inclusion of this final phrase as unresponsive to international legal developments
since 1998, referencing, for example, the fact that the Statute of the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and several national laws on crimes against humanity do not
include it in their definitions of this crime.68 Additionally, Canada, in its 2019
statement to the Sixth Committee, indicated that “the current definition of
63 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 23, Para. 38. It does note that “[c]ertain other grounds have been
suggested […], such as persecution in the form of acts targeting children on the basis of age or
birth”.
64 Canada, ‘Statement on International Law Commission and Crimes Against Humanity’, 31 Octo‐
ber 2019, available at: http://statements.unmeetings.org/media2/23328863/-e-canada-
statement.pdf.
65 Call it What it is Campaign, available at: https://4genderjustice.org/the-hague-principles/#.
66 ‘Civil Society Declaration on Sexual Violence’, available at: https://4genderjustice.org/the-hague-
principles/#. The Declaration has two Annexures: 1) Commentary on the principles, indicia and
examples; and 2) explanation of the methodology applied in developing the Declaration.
67 Global Justice Center, ‘Submission to the International Law Commission: The Need to Integrate
a Gender Perspective into the Draft Convention on Crimes Against Humanity’, November 2018,
available at: https://globaljusticecenter.net/files/GJC.CAHSubmission.11.30.2018.pdf.
68 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
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‘forced pregnancy’ would need to be re-examined to ensure that transgender per‐
sons are included within the definition”.69
7 Conclusion: An Overarching Gender Analysis of the Draft Articles Is
Needed
Following the debate on the ILC’s second reading of the Draft Articles, the Sixth
Committee merely resolved that it would “include in the provisional agenda of its
[next] seventy-fifth session an item entitled ‘Crimes against humanity’ … to con‐
tinue to examine the recommendation of the Commission”.70 However, many
States said they would have preferred the Sixth Committee to have resolved to
take concrete steps towards the elaboration of a convention.71
It remains to be seen what will happen next. At the time of writing, in light of
the global COVID-19 pandemic, it is not certain whether the UN General Assem‐
bly and its Sixth Committee will be able to convene in 2020. It is also unclear
whether States will be willing and able to prioritize the elaboration of a new
treaty in the short to medium term in the face of such an immediate and grave
threat.
If and when the Sixth Committee does convene, the authors recommend that
it step back and examine the ILC’s Draft Articles as a whole to determine whether
they are fully gender sensitive and gender informed. One way of doing this is to
apply ‘gender-based analysis plus’.72 This is an overarching analysis that would
help to identify whether and how the draft treaty has gendered impacts on, for
example, victims and accused. The ‘plus’ acknowledges that gender-based analysis
goes beyond biological sex and socially-constructed gender differences, consider‐
ing intersecting identity factors such as age, race, ethnicity, religion and mental
or physical disability.73 The analysis would also extend beyond the definition of
crimes against humanity to include a number of the other Draft Articles. It would
consider, for example, whether non-discrimination clauses should be added to
ensure that investigations and extraditions are undertaken without discrimi‐
nation on various grounds, including gender, and that victim protection is
conducted in a gender-informed manner.
In the authors’ view, the ILC made the correct decision to delete the Rome
Statute’s definition of ‘gender’ from the Draft Articles. Given the polarized debate
on the term ‘gender’ in Rome, it would be disruptive and unproductive to open
the definition to re-negotiation in the context of a new crimes against humanity
69 Canada, supra note 64.
70 UNGA Res. 74/187, 30 December 2019, Para. 3.
71 Forty-three countries expressed this preference. See Statement by Austria (on behalf of 42 other
countries), 74th Session of the General Assembly, 6th Committee, under agenda item 79
(20 November 2019), Para. 33.
72 This type of analysis is commonly used in domestic and international policy and legal circles to
ensure that policies and laws do not result in negative gendered impacts.
73 Status of Women Canada, ‘What Is Gender-Based Analysis Plus?’, available at: https://cfc-
swc.gc.ca/gba-acs/index-en.html. Other intersecting identity factors, such as sexual orientation,
gender identity and intersex, non-binary and trans status are included in the gender analysis.
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treaty. That said, it should be noted that, in the context of the Rome Statute, the
definition of ‘gender’ is neither “outdated” nor “obsolete”, as it is continually
informed by Article 21(3), which requires the ICC to interpret the definition in
line with evolving international law. In this way, the drafters of the Rome Statute
ensured that the ever-growing understanding of how gender is socially construc‐
ted informs the definition. The Draft Articles, in their current form, do not
include such a requirement. Perhaps they should, so as to clarify that domestic
understandings of crimes against humanity evolve along with international law.74
In conclusion, the debate on the term ‘gender’ in the ILC’s Draft Articles has
revealed an impetus in some parts of the international community towards
acceptance of a wider and deeper understanding of the socially-constructed ori‐
gins and aspects of gender, as well as continued opposition to this understanding
by a small minority of States. The ILC process has also highlighted other potential
areas needing consideration, such as the list of persecutory grounds and the defi‐
nition of sexual violence, which would benefit from further analysis. Indeed, the
discussion to date indicates that the Draft Articles are ripe for further gender-
focused analysis.
74 Of course, as a matter of international law, future member States of a crimes against humanity
treaty will be obliged to implement and interpret its provisions consistent with their other obli‐
gations under international law, including international human rights law and non-discrimi‐
nation norms prohibiting persecution of, for example, women and LGBTIQ individuals.
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